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Can Soldiers Do ”the Decent Thing” in War?
The Just War Tradition, The Laws of War, and  
Saving Private Ryan
Ted van Baarda
§ 1 Introduction and Research questions
For a lawyer, to discuss the just war tradition (hereinafter: JWT) with 
theologians and ethicists is a slightly hazardous undertaking. Adherents 
of legal positivism—which represents mainstream legal thinking—will 
argue that JWT is not, and never has been, a valid rule of international 
law.1 Although a strict view on the separation of law and ethics is rarely 
maintained in its undiluted form today, the legal status of JWT remains in 
the balance.2 Lawyers argue that the UN Charter sets an all-encompassing 
standard for the permissibility of the use of force to the exclusion of all 
other—theological, ethical, cultural, etc.—considerations. I will discuss 
JWT nonetheless on the basis of two research questions mentioned below.
The entry into force of the UN Charter on October 24, 1945, introduced 
a new normative framework on the permissibility of states to use armed 
force as a means to settle disputes. The starting point is a lex contra bellum. 
The UN Charter prohibits, save for limited exceptions, the use of force 
by states. It refers to the “scourge of war which twice in our lifetime has 
brought untold sorrow to mankind.” Article 1 § 1 lists its main aim, which 
is “to maintain international peace and security.” To this end, the UN may 
1.  Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte, and Andreas Paulus (eds.), The 
Charter of the United Nations—a Commentary. Volume I (Oxford University Press, 2012), 
204; J. Kunz, “Bellum Iustum and Bellum Legale,” American Journal of International Law 
45 (1951): 529–530; Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defense, 5th ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 69, § 183; F. Berber, Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts, Vol. 2: 
Kriegsrecht, 2nd ed. (CH Beck Verlag, 1969), 26–27 and 30–32; H. Wehberg, Krieg und 
Eroberung im Wandel des Völkerrechts (Metzner, 1953), 25–26.
2.  Benedetto Conforti, “The Doctrine of ‘Just War’ and Contemporary International 
Law,” in International Yearbook of International Law, vol. 3 (2002): 3–4; Joachim von Elbe, 
“The Evolution of the Concept of Just War in International Law,” American Journal of 
International Law 33 (1939), 665–666; Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by 
States (1963), 20–21; A. Nussbaum, “Just War—a Legal Concept?” Michigan Law Review 42 
(1943–1944): 453 et seq, in particular 476–477.
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take “effective collective measures” in order to prevent or remove threats 
to the peace and to suppress acts of aggression.3 Article 2 § 4 stipulates that 
all member states of the United Nations “shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity . . . of 
any state. . . .” The words “shall refrain” outlaw the use of armed force.4 
The UN Charter recognizes the right to “individual and collective self-
defence” (Art. 51) as well as the possibility of armed force mandated by 
the Security Council in order to maintain international peace and security 
(Art. 42); however, the baseline remains the lex contra bellum.5 This stands 
in contrast to the nineteenth century when the demise of JWT was such 
that the predominant legal conviction was that a state had a right to engage 
in war “whenever it pleased.”6
The current contribution consists of two main sections.
In the first section, my research question is: How was the development 
of the modern laws of war influenced by JWT in general, and the criterion 
of right intent in particular? My key points will be that the advent of the 
era of legal positivism has reduced the influence of theology and ethics on 
JWT, reinforcing an ongoing process of secularization in which just intent 
has become virtually nonexistent in current law. Finally, I will make brief 
comments concerning the laws of neutrality.
In the second section, I ask how the answers found in the previous section 
can be applied to a case. I focus on a scene from the film and novel Saving 
Private Ryan.7 My key points will be that neither the criteria of JWT, nor 
the modern laws of war are helpful in giving substance to right intent in 
this case; other considerations are helpful—albeit to a limited extent.
On the basis of these two sections, I will offer a number of conclusions.
§ 2 Modern Laws of War and JWT
The laws of war comprise two main chapters, ius ad bellum and ius in bello. 
The former concerns the question of under which conditions a right to go to 
3.  Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard Hambro, and Anne Patricia Simons, Charter of the United 
Nations. Commentary and Documents (New York & London: Columbia University Press, 
1969), 28.
4.  International Court of Justice, ICJ Rep. 1946, Corfu Channel Case (Albania vs. United 
Kingdom), at p. 35; Simma et al, supra note 1, p. 203 et seq.; Ian Brownlie, International Law 
and the Use of Force by States (1963), 116.
5.  Kunz, supra note 1, p. 116.
6.  Dinstein, supra note 1, p. 78 at § 207–208.
7.  Max Collins, Saving Private Ryan (Penguin Books, 1998), 145 et seq; in the film directed 
by Steven Spielberg (1998) at approximately 50 minutes.
2
The International Journal of Ethical Leadership, Vol. 7 [2020], Art. 8
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol7/iss1/8
The International Journal of Ethical Leadership   Fall 2020 62
war exists; the latter discusses the question of what rules apply during battle. 
Ius ad bellum attempted to define, albeit with moderate precision, a legitimate 
case of a casus belli. Ius ad bellum concerns the justice of war, whereby consid-
erations of pacifism need to be reconciled—however uncomfortably—with 
the need to have a credible defense against an enemy. The latter term is that 
of ius in bello, which concerns the rules which govern conduct of soldiers 
during battle. Ius in bello concerns justice during war. For a war to be just, it 
must meet, according to many authors, six criteria of ius ad bellum. These are 
(1) a just cause; (2) a legitimate authority; (3) right intent; (4) a fair chance 
of success; (5) proportionality; and (6) last resort.8 Ius in bello is considered to 
have merely two criteria which need to be met in order for a war to be fought 
correctly. These two are (7) discrimination—the distinction between com-
batants and noncombatants must be respected; and (8) proportionality—that 
the military advantages of a given attack must outweigh the consequences in 
terms of death and damage to civilians and civilian objects.
§ 2.1 Ius ad bellum: Influences of the UN Charter
It was ius ad bellum that was the most influenced by the entry into force 
of the UN Charter; its key criteria were made redundant or were at least 
drastically reinterpreted. The first criterion, the causa iusta, became obsolete 
because it presumes the permissibility of armed conflict.
Noteworthy is that the controversial issue of humanitarian intervention 
is not mentioned in the UN Charter. Since the legal premise is ius contra 
bellum, it stands to reason to conclude that an intervention without the 
framework of the UN Charter is in violation of international law. Since 
the Kosovo crisis, this conclusion has come under scrutiny: gross human 
rights violations may become so unbearable that intervention is required, a 
mandate of the Security Council regardless.9 This was at least the position 
of Belgium before the International Court of Justice.10 Thus, old theological 
8.  Among the large volume of literature: Bruno Coppieters and Nick Fotion, Moral Con-
straints on War (Oxford, 2002); Donald A. Wells, An Encyclopedia of War and Ethics (Green-
wood Press, 1996), 256.
9.  Conforti, supra note 2; International Commission on Intervention and State Sover-
eignty, The Responsibility to Protect (2001), UN Doc. A/57/303. This report was bolstered by 
the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s report Implementing the Responsibility to Protect 
(2009).
10.  ICJ Rep. (1999) Legality of the Use of Force (Provisional Measures) (Serbia and Montene-
gro vs. Belgium), Pleadings of Belgium, 10 May 1999, CR 99/15 (comptes rendu) 17 et 
seq; Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
213; Jonathan I. Charney “Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo” (1999), 32 
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and moral arguments, which lawyers presumed to have become redundant 
since the establishment of the UN, reappeared—albeit with a legal coating.
Article 2 § 4 of the UN Charter inevitably had consequences for the 
other criteria of ius ad bellum. The second criterion—concerning the right 
authority—has traditionally been seen as referring to the state, which 
possessed the exclusive right to decide whether it may go to war. Under 
the UN Charter, this right became circumscribed. Although the state 
still possesses the right to exercise force in self-defense, it came under an 
obligation to refer the matter to the Security Council (Art. 37 § 1), which 
has “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security” (Art. 24). In cases other than self-defense, a state may no longer 
decide whether there exists a casus belli; such questions now fall under the 
authority of the Security Council, if a “threat to the peace, a breach of the 
peace and act of aggression” exists (Art. 39). The peace referred to here is 
“international peace”; an internal disorder within the boundaries of a state 
will only fall within the jurisdiction of the UN if it effects international 
peace.11 As Art. 2 § 7 points out, the Charter does not authorize the UN “to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of any State.” Although this provision seems, at a first glance, obvious, it has 
become contentious in the case of gross, massive human rights violations 
which take place within the boundaries of a state, and which do not pose 
a threat to international peace.
The third, fourth and fifth criterion may all be considered obsolete, 
since their premise is the legitimacy of war. The sixth and last criterion by 
contrast, concerning war as a last resort, is still alive, although its interpreta-
tion is now cast in the framework of the UN Charter. Various provisions 
emphasize the obligation of states to settle disputes by peaceful means, 
such as mediation by the Secretary General (Art. 33 jo. Art. 98 and 99) 
or adjudication by the International Court of Justice (Art. 33 jo. Art. 94).
§ 2.2 Ius in bello: Influences from The Hague and Geneva
The other chapter of the JWT, ius in bello, has undergone a different 
development. Ius in bello was influenced decisively during the second half of 
the nineteenth century. In 1863, the Swiss merchant and Calvinist Henri 
Dunant witnessed the Battle of Solferino, where he conducted heroic efforts 
Vand J Transnat’l L. 1231 and (1999) 93 AJIL 834, 836; Christine Gray, International Law and 
the Use of Force, 3rd ed. (2008), 45.
11.  Goodrich et al, supra note 3, p. 27; Dinstein, supra note 1, p. 87, § 234.
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to comfort the wounded. The publication of his memoirs combined with his 
subsequent actions led to both the adoption of an international treaty and the 
establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross. In the same 
era, the czar of Russia initiated a peace conference. The conference adopted, 
in 1899, The Hague Rules of Land Warfare,12 which were updated in 1907.13
These initiatives mark a gradual development in which ius in bello would 
become a chapter of the laws of war which would coexist on a par with 
ius ad bellum. Traditionally, the laws of war had been enshrined in custom, 
considerations of chivalry, and the Christian tradition. It encompassed 
a transnational professional ethic, which held sway between knights; an 
ethic which could be understood by a knight in, say, Burgundy, as well 
as in Bavaria.14 In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, the 
role of nation-states became dominant, and with it, the responsibility of 
those nation-states for the forces operating under their control. The laws 
of war evolved from a transnational professional ethic into a set of inter-
national codifications; ius in bello effectively transformed into a lex in bello. 
It matured considerably. Modern ius in bello is enshrined in the Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg, four Red Cross Geneva 
Conventions,15 three Additional Protocols, a number of UN treaties such 
as the Chemical Weapons Convention,16 and the Treaty Banning Landmines,17 
plus the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former 
Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Court, etc. In all, modern ius in 
bello consists of more than five hundred substantive provisions, a number 
which stands in contrast to the two criteria of JWT.
12.  Convention II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1899), https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=CD0F6C83F96FB459C1256
3CD002D66A1&action=openDocument.
13.  Convention IV Respecting Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=4D47F92DF3966A7EC12563CD002D6788&a
ction=openDocument.
14.  M. H. Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages (Routledge, 1965); Robert C. 
Stacey, “The Age of Chivalry,” in Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos and Mark R. 
Shulman (eds), The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World (Yale University 
Press, 1994), 29.
15.  ICRC website, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreaties1949.xsp.
16.  Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemi-
cal Weapons and on their Destruction (1993), https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-
convention.
17.  Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on Their Destruction (1997), http://www.apminebanconvention.org/overview-
and-convention-text.
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In that codified form, ius in bello laid a claim to a universal validity irre-
spective of the question which of the warring parties possessed a causa iusta. 
Although the development had been gradual through the centuries, its impor-
tance is fundamental. Before the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
distinction between ius ad bellum and ius in bello had been pregnable. There 
existed no generic ius in bello as we know it today, and the rights and duties 
of the belligerents depended, according to Grotius and many of his predeces-
sors, on the question who fought on behalf of the causa iusta. By contrast, the 
applicability of modern ius in bello would become separate from the question 
of which party possessed causa iusta. The reason for this development is obvi-
ous: in military history, virtually all parties have claimed that they possessed 
the just cause, while disclaiming the purported just cause of their enemy. 
Thus, if the application of ius in bello were to be dependent on the question of 
whether one’s enemy respects one’s own claim to a just cause, then one may 
readily assume that ius in bello would be applied only infrequently, if ever.18
§ 2.3 Intermediate conclusion (1)
While traditional ius ad bellum has been largely subsumed by the UN 
Charter, this is not the case with ius in bello, since treaty law on ius in 
bello existed before the UN was established. This leads to a peculiar legal 
situation. Modern ius in bello is arguably the only chapter of law which 
regulates a prohibited activity: even if a war is fought in violation of the 
lex contra bellum, the warring parties remain bound by ius in bello.19 One 
may call this an anomaly, but it is an admission that international law is, 
in comparison to national law, immature. A key premise of national law 
is that a governing authority exists which can not only proclaim, but also 
enforce, the law. As a result, there is no need to have a specific chapter 
in national law that prescribes how to act when the law is violated. No 
comparable authority exists on the international plane. An observation by 
Hall, dating back to the era before the League of Nations remains valid 
today, namely that “[i]nternational law has no alternative but to accept war, 
independently of the justice of its origin. . . . Hence both parties to every war are 
regarded as being in an identical legal position, and consequently as being 
possessed of equal rights.”20
18.  Berber, supra note 1, p. 32.
19.  L. Oppenheim, International Law. A Treatise, Vol. II, Disputes, War and Neutrality, 7th ed. 
(H. Lauterpacht ed, 1952), 218, § 218.
20.  W. E. Hall, International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1880) 52, quoted partially J. L. 
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The quote will not satisfy the reader’s sense of justice; it is but a sobering 
acknowledgement of realpolitik in a deeply divided and militarized world. 
The mood that the quote encapsulates marks the abandonment of attempts 
to distinguish just wars from unjust wars, and perhaps even lawful ones from 
unlawful ones.21 The italicized words make any reference to a causa iusta 
irrelevant. The quote has the merit of candor, in the sense that it admits 
that international law has failed in the main task of any legal system—to 
maintain peace and order.
Although the legal situation has changed since the days of the League of 
Nations, the importance of the changes should not be exaggerated. True, 
eye-catching changes have been made: the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal includes the crime of aggression; true also, Art. 2 § 4 
of the UN Charter codifies a lex contra bellum; the Security Council may, 
under Art. 39, determine “a breach of the peace or an act of aggression”; 
and the International Court of Justice may determine whether military 
activity by a state violates international law.22 However, concerning the 
powers of the Security Council, the UN Charter makes no mention of 
considerations of international law or justice. Proposals to include such a 
reference were resisted by the major powers “on the grounds that this would 
tie the hands of the Security Council to an undesirable extent and that, in 
any case, the object of collective measures was to prevent or suppress the 
use of armed force, and not to achieve a [ just] settlement.”23 Hence, with 
a slight exaggeration one might say that, by offering both warring parties 
an identical legal position, the applicability of the laws of war has become 
a matter of a legal technicality, rather than a matter of justice.
§ 2.4 The position of right intent in ius in bello
Well-known are the words of Augustine: “. . . the real evils in war are 
love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild 
resistance, and the lust for power.”24 Reconciling early Christian pacifism 
by Brierly, “International Law and the Resort to Armed Force,” Cambridge Law Journal 4 
(1932), 308 (emphasis added). See also: von Elbe, supra note 2, p. 684–685; Kunz, supra note 
1, p. 116.
21.  Brierly, ibid.
22.  ICJ Rep. (1986), Military Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua vs. United 
States).
23.  Goodrich, Hambro, and Simons, supra note 3, at p. 28 and 44; Simma et al, supra note 1, 
p. 1240–1241 and 1245–1246.
24.  Augustine, Contra Faustum, XXII, 74; Roland Kany, “Augustine’s Theology of Peace 
and the Beginning of Christian Just War Theory,” in Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven and Wil-
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with the necessity of the state to defend itself against an external attack, 
Augustine argued that violence in defense of one’s loved ones or comrades-
in-arms is justified.25 Augustine does not differentiate between ius ad bellum 
and ius in bello; judging by his choice of words, he appears to think of both.
Right intent is a criterion pertinent to both ius ad bellum as well as ius 
in bello, even though it is usually listed as part of the ad bellum chapter 
rather than the in bello chapter. According to Syse and Reichberg, “right 
intention should govern both the decision to resort to armed force (ius ad 
bellum) and the conduct of war itself (ius in bello).” They offer two reasons. 
“First, if participation in war is to have an ethical basis, it is necessary that 
effective coordination be maintained between the political aim (to oppose 
grave injustice, to achieve a fair and lasting peace) and whatever means are 
used to achieve that aim. . . . Right intention is relevant in a second manner, 
insofar as it ought to inform the inward disposition (affectus) of those engaged 
in the war effort. Hatred of the enemy and desire for sheer revenge were 
deemed wholly impermissible, even in times of war.”26 A twelfth-century 
author, Alexander of Hales, joined these two aspects of just war teachings 
and called the former iustus affectus and the latter debita intentio.27
The right intent could justify as well as limit recourse to war (ad bellum); 
by the same token, it held sway over conduct during war (in bello).28 One 
author writes that “[I]t was right intention that enabled belligerents to fulfill 
the manifold requirements of a just war. In this way, the rules of war were 
made dependent on the virtues of war. The moral psychology of the just war-
rior was not to be taken for granted. What did tend to be taken for granted 
were the principles themselves (particularly the principles of what later came 
to be called ius in bello). The reason for this seems clear. With right intention 
in place, the other criteria could take care of themselves. In its absence, no 
amount of moral deliberation could prevent a descent into the moral abyss 
of war.”29 However, technical developments—the invention of gunpowder 
in particular—made the development of articulate rules necessary.
liam A. Barbieri (eds), From Just War to Modern Peace Ethics (Berlin/Boston, 2012), 44.
25.  Coppieters and Kashnikov, supra note 8, p. 64.
26.  Henrik Syse and Gregory Reichberg, Ethics, Nationalism and Just War: Medieval and 
Contemporary Perspectives (Washington, DC, 2007), 206.
27.  Ibid, p. 206n.
28.  J. Daryl Charles, “Framing the Issues in Moral Terms I: Applying the Just War Tradi-
tion,” in James Turner Johnson and Eric D. Patterson (eds), The Ashgate Companion to 
Military Ethics (Farnham, 2015), 122 et seq.
29.  Anthony Coates, “Culture, the Enemy and the Moral Restraint of War,” in Richard 
Sorabji and David Rodin, The Ethics of War. Shared Problems and Different Traditions (Ashgate, 
2005), 215.
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De Vitoria referred specifically to military operations when discussing 
the doctrine of double effect. Well-known is his example of the enemy 
fortress which needs to be stormed at the risk of some civilians inside. The 
civilians are then a sad, but justifiable loss in view of the larger evil which 
has to be confronted.30 Thus, De Vitoria raised a question which modern 
lawyers call “collateral damage.” The criterion of right intent was more 
limited in De Vitoria’s view than in Aquinas’ view. De Vitoria transformed 
Aquinas’ criterion of right intent into the requirement “not to harm out of 
greed.”31 Effectively, De Vitoria reduced the criterion of right intent to “. . . 
what Suarez and other authors in the sixteenth century were to call debitus 
modus, the right manner of waging war, the limit not to be exceeded.”32 
Suarez’ analysis of just war was conducted in foro externo and had a legal 
flavor to it.33 Under the concept of the debitus modus, warfare was mainly 
limited to lawful means and methods.34 Justenhoven observes that, given 
the brutal behavior of Spanish conquistadores in South America, it seemed 
. . . obvious, that the sixteenth-century soldiers requested a more 
specific advice than to have the right intention in waging a 
just war. The issue at stake was to know precisely of how to act 
externally when trying to have the right intention. The refer-
ence to the right intention as such seemed no longer enough 
in a time that produced a number of new ethical questions of 
the conduct of war.35
30.  Francisco de Vitoria, De Indis et de Iure Belli Relectiones, partially reproduced in David 
Kinsella & Craig L. Carr, The Morality of War—a Reader (Lynne Rienner, 2007), 76. Howard 
M. Hensel, The Prism of Just War: Asian and Western Perspectives on the Legitimate Use of Mili-
tary Force (London/New York, 2016), 59.
31.  Francisco de Vitoria, quoted by Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, “Francisco de Vitoria: Just 
War as a Defence of International Law,” in Justenhoven and Barbieri, supra note 24, p. 134; 
Alex J. Bellamy, Just Wars. From Cicero to Iraq (Cambridge, 2006) 50 et seq. Anthony Pagden, 
“Conquest and the Just War: the ‘School of Salamanca’ and the ‘Affair of the Indies’” in 
Sankar Muthu (ed), Empire and Modern Political Thought (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
34 et seq.
32.  Gregory Reichberg, Henrik Syse, and Endre Begby, The Ethics of War. Classic and 
Contemporary Readings (Blackwell, 2006), 323 and 360; Peter Haggenmacher, “Just War and 
Regular War in Sixteenth Century Spanish doctrine,” IRRC, no. 290, 1992, 441; Robert 
Kolb, “Origin of the Twin Terms Ius ad Bellum/Ius in Bello,” IRRC, no. 320, 1997; Wolf-
gang Huber, Hans Richard-Reuter: Friedensethik (Kohlhammer, 1990), 65 and 80; Markus 
Kremer, Den Frieden verantworten: politische Ethik bei Francisco Suarez (Kohlhammer, 2008), 
223 et seq.
33.  Nussbaum, supra note 2, p. 462.
34.  Suarez, quoted by Hensel, supra note 30, p. 59-60.
35.  Justenhoven, supra note 24, p. 135.
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Thus, “on the eve of the sectarian strife that was soon to engulf Europe,”36 
the stage was set for the quest for externalized—lawyers would say “objec-
tive”—standards. While the Age of Discovery raised—at the ad bellum 
level—fundamental questions about the legitimacy of conquest, the inven-
tion of gun powder, the introduction of muskets and canon, raised—at the 
in bello level—new questions concerning proportionality and distinction. 
Is it proportional to use muskets against an enemy that is only armed with 
knives and spears? Is the use of canon justified, if one no longer aims at an 
individual as in the case of a musket, but at a group of individuals where 
soldiers and civilians are caught up together (which is effectively De Vito-
ria’s example)? Do the laws of war apply only within one’s own cultural 
hemisphere—with all its Eurocentric and Christian implications—or do 
the laws of war also apply in wars with enemies from another cultural 
background? May any enemy be considered to be barbarian simply because 
he is a heretic or does not fit the Westphalian conceptual framework? In 
view of such complicated questions, the generic concept of right intent 
came in need of elaboration.
Thus, the standards of the just war gradually shifted from theology and 
ethics to externalized criteria in law. Grotius placed international law on a 
secular footing despite his frequent references to the Bible. Having emphasized 
natural law and Man’s ability to reason, Grotius announced that his theory 
would remain valid even if God did not exist.37 Grotius retorted the Augus-
tinian position on right intent, with its emphasis on the inner disposition 
of the individual. While Grotius recognizes an “insatiable desire for riches” 
as an unjust cause of war, such a criterion is, in his view, too subjective; the 
relations between states should be based on objectified criteria.
Nonetheless, it would be as late as the nineteenth century that a codified 
ius in bello would appear. Given the strict separation of ius ad bellum from ius 
in bello, the criterion of right intent was relegated, probably by default rather 
than design, to ius ad bellum. From the nineteenth century onwards, codified 
documents concerning ius in bello are virtually silent on the right intent.38
The drafters of the Hague Regulations on Warfare on Land of 1899 and 
1907 admit that they have not been able to agree on regulations “covering 
all the circumstances which arise in practice.” Therefore, they conclude 
that, in the absence of a specific legal provision, unforeseen cases should 
36.  Reichberg, Syse and Begby, supra note 32, p. 290.
37.  Hugo Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, prologomena XI; Nussbaum, supra note 2, p. 466.
38.  Supra notes 25 and 26; Wehberg, supra note 1, p. 26; Nussbaum, ibid.
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not “be left to the arbitrary judgement of military commanders” (emphasis 
added).39 This is a remarkable statement. Of course, moral lapses occur in 
the heat of battle, but I am not aware any other profession whereby it is 
enshrined in law that the entire profession is presumed to be arbitrary. It 
seems as if right intent has never existed.
The drafters of the Hague Regulations also decided that unforeseen circum-
stances ought not to be relegated to a normative void. The Russian diplomat 
Martens drafted a clause—known today as the Martens clause—which reads 
that in cases where the laws of war are silent, soldiers take into account 
“. . . the principles of international law as they may result from the usages 
established by civilised nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements 
of the public conscience.” Again, the choice of words is interesting—right 
intent is not mentioned. What it does mention as its primary source, are 
the “usages established by civilised nations.” It needs the eye of the lawyer 
to notice the point: the quote refers to customary international law—that is 
to say, the practice of states to behave in a certain way because they believe 
that they are under a legal obligation to so—the opinio iuris sive necessitas. 
The term “usages established by civilised nations” does not refer to JWT; 
it does not refer to commanders who have to exercise their best judgement 
on the battlefield. Thus, right intent has effectively been “codified away.”
§ 2.5 Just War Tradition and Neutrality
It is necessary to briefly discuss a subject which is only infrequently 
mentioned in the context of JWT, namely the laws of neutrality. Under 
international law, neutrality designates the legal status of a state which 
does not participate in the armed conflict which is waged by other states. 
Neither the term neutrality nor the concept can be traced further back 
than fifteenth century when the term stille sitzen (to sit still) was used.40 
Neutrality did not fit the logic of JWT, with its emphasis of the struggle 
of good against evil. In such a seemingly apocalyptic battle, third parties 
should at the very least offer moral support to the side which possessed the 
just cause.41 The practical difficulties with this perspective were obvious. 
For third states, it was often difficult to know which side possessed the just 
cause, while it might also be perilous for them to make such a decision if 
one of the warring parties is considerably more powerful.
39.  Supra note 12.
40.  John Westlake, International Law. Vol II, War (1913), 190.
41.  Stephen C. Neff, Law and the War of Nations: A General History (2005), 75.
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Bynkershoek was the first author to decouple the just cause from neutral-
ity. Bynkershoek argued “a neutral has nothing to do with the justice or 
injustice of war, it is not for him to sit as judge between friends who are 
at war with each other, and to give or deny more or less to the one or the 
other.”42 Thus, he made an important step toward establishing the laws of 
neutrality as an independent chapter under the laws of war.
During the nineteenth century—i.e. the century when JWT was fad-
ing—the laws of neutrality matured. The right of neutrals was not to be 
attacked; their key duties were two-fold, firstly to refrain from interfering in 
the hostilities, and secondly to treat the belligerents on an even-handed basis.
While neutrality became enshrined in international law, its moral praise-
worthiness remained debatable. Oppenheim reminds the reader that among 
the war-tired belligerent peoples of the First World War there was the 
general feeling that a neutral state was shirking its share of the burden of 
humanity, while the belligerents did all the dirty work to save civilization 
from a brutal enemy.43 The perceived low praiseworthiness of neutrality 
was also due to the fact that the Hague Regulations of 1907 did not pro-
hibit commercial enterprises of neutral states from trading with either—or 
both—belligerents for a handsome profit. Neutrality became tainted by 
war profiteering.
Neutrality is not necessarily synonymous with a lack of integrity. Stille 
sitzen does not require that one should remain callous to the suffering on 
the battlefield. When Henri Dunant witnessed the Battle of Solferino, 
stille sitzen was not on his mind. Inspired by the suffering of the wounded, 
he created a metamorphosis of the traditional concept of state neutrality. 
Relying on the flag of his neutral Switzerland, he entered the battlefield 
and comforted the wounded. Dunant’s actions and the subsequent estab-
lishment of the ICRC added a new meaning to neutrality: neutrality was 
not merely an instrument which served the interests of states. Rather, the 
dignity of the victims presented itself as a new purpose which neutrality 
could serve. Symbolically, the flag of the Red Cross is an inversion of the 
flag of Switzerland. While state neutrality could be seen as an instrument 
of egoism—albeit perhaps justified egoism because a state may wish to 
protect itself from attack—medical neutrality could be seen as an instru-
ment of altruism.
42.  Bynkershoek, Questiones juris publici (1737) p. 62. Oppenheim, International Law (6th 
rev. ed., 1944), 489–490, §§ 287–288; Neff, supra note 41, p. 151–152.
43.  Oppenheim, ibid, p. 498, § 292A.
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§ 2.6 Intermediate Conclusion (2)
In sum, traditional ius in bello contrasts with modern ius in bello:
• today’s ius in bello is legal rather than moral or theological;
• today’s ius in bello is distinct from ius ad bellum;
• it is universally applicable rather than being Eurocentric and 
limited to Christian knights;
• today, compliance is mainly based on subordination to a sover-
eign on the basis of a culture of guilt, rather than shame;
• positive ius in bello works on the basis of the abstract and secular 
concept of the legal subject, rather than a naturalistic conception 
of Man as an image of God;
• whether a combatant has the right (pious) intent is barely rel-
evant; he should obey orders, laws, and treaties;
• the laws of neutrality are separate from the just cause;
• neutrality evolved from a policy instrument of states into an 
instrument of humanitarian assistance.
§ 3 Saving Private Ryan—introduction
The current section focuses on the scene from the film Saving Private Ryan, 
where a squad of American soldiers comes into contact with a French fami-
ly.44 When analyzing the scene, I will seek an answer to my second research 
question, namely whether either JWT, or the laws of war as they stood at 
the time, or the criterion of the right intent, might have assisted the squad.
Almost immediately after US forces landed in Normandy on June 6, 1944, 
the film shows a scene in the offices of the Pentagon, where the American 
High Command takes cognizance of the fact that all three brothers of Pvt. 
Ryan have been killed in action. The order is given that the last living 
brother is to be brought home. Thus, Captain Miller, who is at the beach 
in Normandy, is ordered to lead a squad and find him. In one of the first 
liberated villages, buildings have been reduced to rubble. The squad finds 
a partially demolished house, where one of the outer walls has gone. A 
French family appears on the second floor: a father, a mother with a baby 
in her arms, and a little girl; they need to get off the second floor. Suddenly, 
the father grabs the girl. Near the edge of the floor, he lets her dangle in 
the air, waiting for one of the American soldiers to climb up the rubble 
44.  Supra note 9, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CGypoXVt31k; in the novel at p. 
144–161. Slight discrepancies exist between the film and the novel.
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and take the girl to safety. Private Caparzo decides, against orders, to take 
the girl from her father’s hands.
§ 3.1 The deficiency of the usual criteria to assess the 
situation
What was the right thing to do for Captain Miller and his men? The 
moral dilemma for them is whether they should, at the risk of their own 
lives, get the family down. The dilemma does not relate to the applica-
tion of violence, even though the enemy is lurking. Since the traditional 
criteria of ius in bello—the criterion of discrimination and the criterion 
of proportionality—relate to the application of violence, they can only 
circumstantially inform Captain Miller.
Other perspectives do apply, including the legal perspective. At the level 
of national law: Captain Miller’s orders do not deal with humanitarian 
assistance, nor do they allow him to get distracted by all kinds of situations, 
the consequences of which may result in a failure to carry out the objective. 
In military parlance: the mission comes first. The fact that the surroundings 
are hostile emphasizes the point. Thus, national military law gives him 
clear grounds to not to assist the French family. Concerning international 
law: there did not exist, at the time, a Geneva Convention concerning the 
protection of civilians which required him to render assistance. In conclu-
sion, both national and international law offer Captain Miller safe legal 
grounds if he would order the squad to move on.
Clear as the legal case may be, it does not bring me to a conclusion. At 
issue is not the question, What is the lawful thing to do? At issue is the 
question, What is the right thing to do?
JWT hardly paid attention to humanitarian assistance. Medieval thought 
was little concerned about the conduct during war, other than that civil-
ians may not be attacked. The criterion of the right intent, as it is handed 
down from history, is both too limited in scope and too vague (as I will 
demonstrate below) to guide Captain Miller—a point which is reminiscent 
of the views of Spanish scholasticists like De Vitoria and Suarez. However, 
the preference of De Vitoria and Suarez to reduce the recta intentio to the 
debitus modus is not of much assistance either.
§ 3.2 The ‘Morality of Decency’ vs. the ‘Morality of War’
Seemingly, the dilemma presents itself in a form that is archetypical for 
warfare—the clash between the necessity to defeat the enemy and humani-
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tarian considerations. The spokesman for humanitarian considerations is 
Private Caparzo. With the girl in his hands, he says, “She reminds me of 
my niece, sir.” He emphasizes the psychological proximity of the person 
in need. He reminds us of the fact that he has a personal life. He is not 
only an infantryman; he is a brother, an uncle, an Italian American, and a 
guy from Chicago who is able to show tenderness in contrast to his usual 
hard-boiled posture. The moral framework of his personal life, as an uncle 
to his niece, is taking precedence over his professional life—the latter being 
construed around a utilitarian perspective of his role as an infantryman who 
needs to win battles. Inspired by his private moral framework, he appeals 
to common decency.
Captain Miller is the spokesman for the opposite perspective. In the 
book and film, he is largely depicted as a decent person, struggling to 
combine decency with his responsibility as a commanding officer.45 Only 
much later in the book do we learn that he is a school teacher from Penn-
sylvania and a coach of a football team who has a wife and kids.46 During 
the sniper scene however, his private being remains invisible; he adheres 
strictly to his role as commanding officer. Operational considerations are 
at the forefront of his mind.
The contrast between the opposing views is emphasized by what happens 
next. Climbing down the rubble, Private Caparzo says: “Captain, let’s do 
the decent thing. Let’s at least take these kids down the road to the next 
town.”47 Moments later, he gets killed by the sniper. In his analysis of the 
film, Prior contrasts the morality of decency with the morality of war: “. . . 
the central contrast is between home and the battlefield. Home, which is 
interestingly enough the milieu of the individual morality of the soldier 
as a civilian, is the place in which we also find the morality of decency.”48 
Prior describes this as morality simpliciter: “[i]ts fundamental concept is a 
universal respect for all human beings as moral agents.” Captain Miller 
gets caught on the horns of the dilemma, casting any implicit reference to 
right intent overboard: “We aren’t here to do the decent thing. We are here 
to follow orders.” One does not have to sympathize with his emotions to 
recognize that he is, in an operational sense, correct. After Private Caparzo 
45.  William J. Prior, “ ‘We Aren’t Here to Do the Decent Thing’: Saving Private Ryan and 
the Morality of War,” in US Army War College Quarterly, Vol. XXX, Autumn 2000, no. 3.
46.  Collins, supra note 7, p. 245 and 247.
47.  Ibid, 148.
48.  Prior, supra note 45.
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gets shot—effectively for being decent—Captain Miller snarls: “That’s why 
we can’t take children with us.”
Is Private Caparzo representing the just war criterion of right intent 
when he refers to “the decent thing to do”? Or is he naïve? Or both? Is film 
director Spielberg trying to tell us that being decent in times of war is going 
to get you killed? In other words, is the morality of decency irreconcil-
able with the morality of war? If true, does this mean that the conclusion 
that the criterion of right intent places an undue burden on combatants is 
inescapable? But if JWT and humanitarian law forego the criterion of right 
intent—and, by implication, forego considerations of justice—what does that 
mean for the two criteria of ius in bello—the criteria of discrimination and 
of proportionality? What justifies the very existence of these two criteria, 
if considerations of justice are discarded? How can this be reconciled with 
the judgement of the International Court of Justice49 that “elementary 
considerations of humanity” remain “exacting” in times of war?
When I discuss this scene with a class of military officers, they show 
their impatience with the lack of professionalism displayed by Private Car-
pazo. Although they understand why Private Caparzo sympathizes with 
the French family, they view this as no excuse to forget professional con-
siderations. If Captain Miller and his men were to save the family—and 
my students emphasize “if”—then the first thing to do is ensure that the 
enemy is not lurking. A house-to-house search should be conducted first. 
After it has become clear that there is no enemy and perimeter security has 
been established, then a soldier could move forward to aid the family. By 
acting on impulse, Private Caparzo takes unilateral risks. This is contrary 
to military ethos. Warfare is quintessentially a group activity. “Everyone 
is part of the team, and the effectiveness of the whole depends on each 
individual . . . playing his or her full part.”50
It is not inhumane to check the surroundings first, and then the captain 
can decide. Now, various soldiers shout, the captain loses control and chaos 
reigns, even before the sniper fires his shot. Right intent—taken here in the 
meaning of a willingness to consider the plight of the French family—is not 
some innocent, idealistic consideration detached from operational reality; 
it must be embedded in considerations of proficiency. My classes conclude 
49.  Supra note 4, p. 22.
50.  Timothy Cross, “Military Values and Traditions,” in Kevin M. Cahill (ed), A Framework 
for Survival: Health, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters (Basic 
Books, 1993), 94.
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that Private Caparzo only demonstrates right intent in the naïve meaning 
of the word, but not in any militarily proficient sense.
§ 3.3 The Humanitarian Aspects of the Scene
Throughout the film, Miller’s men have difficulty with the fact that a 
squad of eight has to rescue one man who does not belong to their squad. 
Why should Ryan’s mother deserve such a treatment? All members of the 
squad have mothers, don’t they?51 Thus, the typical aspect of small-unit 
morality is played out, the “band of brothers,” the bond between a soldier 
and his immediate colleagues.
The decision to bring home Private Ryan is a humanitarian argument, 
but only to a limited extent. It revolves around one fellow American soldier. 
The encounter with the French family is arguably the most important 
interruption of the squad’s mission. Unexpectedly, Captain Miller and 
his men have to consider expanding their humanitarian responsibilities to 
a universal level. This lies uncomfortably with them. The arguments in 
favor of assisting the French family can be various: it may be psychological 
proximity, or Christian love for one’s fellow human being (Private Caparzo 
appears to offer a rosary to the girl);52 it may also be the concept of humanity 
which underpins the Red Cross.
Fischer refers to the novel The Brothers Karamazov by Dostoyevski, where 
the younger brother of father Zossima remarks that “everybody of us is 
responsible for everyone else, and I most of all.”53 Appealing as this argument 
may be at first sight, it easily turns against itself. If one feels responsible for 
rescuing person A in situation A, then one must also feel responsible for 
rescuing person B in situation B, for person C in situation C . . . , etc. In 
the context of humanitarian emergencies the problem is one of focus: how 
one can focus on a given mission, or on a given priority, without being 
distracted by other urgent situations? This is a considerable stress factor for 
both military and humanitarian personnel alike, since it inevitably implies 
that victims are left to die. The humanitarian argument, important as it is, 
cannot be, by itself, sufficient to represent the right intent.
51.  Prior, supra note 45.
52.  Avery Cardinal Dulles, S. J., “Christians and Humanitarian Action,” in Cahill, supra note 
p. 50, 92–93.
53.  David Fisher, “Humanitarian Intervention” in Charles Reed and David Ryall, The Price 
of Peace: Just War in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 110.
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§ 3.4 Captain Miller’s Consequentalism vs. Sergeant Horvath’s 
Anthropological Perspective
That evening, with the sniper incident behind him, Captain Miller 
reflects on what happened in an empty church. In an unusually private 
conversation with Sergeant Horvath, both wrestle with the responsibility of 
a commanding officer. “‘Every time you get one of your boys killed,’ Miller 
said softly, almost prayerfully, ‘you tell yourself you just saved the lives of 
two, three, ten, maybe a hundred other men and boys. ( . . . ) You know how 
many men I’ve lost under my command?’”54 When the Sergeant doesn’t 
know the answer, Miller continues: “Caparzo made ninety-four. So, hell 
that means I have probably saved the lives of ten times that many. . . . See, 
it’s that simple. Just do the math—it lets you choose the mission over the 
man, every time.” With these words, Captain Miller sketches the dilemma 
of a commanding officer. While a commanding officer is responsible for the 
well-being of his men, he is required to send them into harm’s way. The 
calculus is one of utility, based on military necessity. The interests of the 
individual become subordinate to the interests of the squad, company, or 
even the nation. It goes without saying that this calculus is uncomfortable 
in a democracy, which emphases individual freedom.
“‘Except this time,’ the Sergeant said, ‘the mission is the man.’”55 The 
response to Miller’s words come as a surprise. The calculus of consequential-
ism is curtailed by considerations of a humanitarian, almost anthropological 
nature. Soldiers are no longer pawns on a chessboard, to be moved forward 
and backward as military expediency dictates. Ryan does not merely possess 
a functional value as an infantryman; Ryan is a human being with dignity 
in his own right.
Captain Miller would soon swing round to the Sergeant’s point of view—
that is, when Captain Miller and Private Ryan finally meet face to face 
at the bridge. There, Ryan not only learns that he has lost all three of his 
brothers, but also that two of Captain Miller’s men have died in the effort 
to find him. Ryan refuses to leave the bridge and to return to his mother. 
Captain Miller does not press the order. The world seems peaceful to him, 
now: “Sergeant, we have crossed some invisible boundary.”56 The Sergeant 
responds in unpolished language: “. . . someday we might look back on this 
and figure savin’ Private Ryan was the one decent thing we were able to 
54.  Collins, supra note 7, p. 181.
55.  Ibid, p. 182.
56.  Ibid, p. 261.
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pull out of this goddamn shithole of a war.”57 The morality of decency is 
raised again—and again by relating the professional role of a soldier to his 
civilian life. Private Ryan has also become a member of the band of brothers 
to which Sergeant Horvath and Captain Miller belong.
The strength of this brotherhood takes on an almost transcendental nature 
by what follows. When Miller is dying on the bridge from his wounds, he 
looks at the Private Ryan he had come to save.
“‘Earn this,’ Miller said softly.
‘Sir?’ Ryan asked.
Now the captain repeated it firmly, an order: ‘Earn this.’”58
The captain’s last words emphasize the importance of meritorious and 
purposeful conduct—not consequentialism. His words are not lost on Private 
Ryan. In the brilliant epilogue, we see Ryan, retired, walking through St. 
Laurent Military Graveyard, in Normandy, followed by his wife, children, 
and grandchildren. Judging by their faces, his family struggles to understand. 
He is in tears, knowing that his visit to the graveyard will be a last farewell 
to a colleague whom he honors so much. At the grave, Ryan speaks to his 
Captain: “Not a day goes by I don’t think about what happened on that bridge. 
About what we did, and what you said to me. I just want you to know . . . 
I’ve tried. Tried to live my life the best I could. I hope that’s enough. I didn’t 
invent anything. I didn’t cure any diseases. I worked on a farm. I lived a life. 
I only hope, in your eyes at least, I earned what you did for me.”59
With these words, it becomes apparent that Ryan, in his subsequent 
civilian life, interpreted the command “Earn it” as more than a mere 
invocation to live a meritorious life. His words demonstrate his feelings of 
being indebted, of showing right intent. He feels he owes his life, his hap-
piness, and the existence of his entire family to someone he barely knew. 
In being indebted to a colleague, he finds his motivation and purpose in 
his civilian life. In the film there is not just a contrast between the civilian 
and military perspectives—they also reinforce one another. His biography 
has become inextricably intertwined with that of Captain Miller, in a way 
which he can not even explain to his wife. Nonetheless, he needs her to 
answer the question which he is actually asking Captain Miller: “Alice . . . 
have I lived a good life? Am I a good man?”60 The question is immensely 
57.  Ibid, p. 262.
58.  Ibid, p. 311.
59.  Ibid, 315–316 and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IZgoufN99n8.
60.  Ibid, p. 316.
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important to him; he desperately needs to know whether he has “earned it.” 
When her answer is affirmative, he can give Captain Miller his final salute.
§ 4 Conclusions
The modern international order is primarily based on the concept of 
security—not justice. During the nineteenth century, the concept of bellum 
iustum came into disrepute. Under the UN Charter, it was replaced by the 
concept of bellum legale. For the first chapter of the JWT, the ius ad bellum, 
the coming into effect of the UN Charter meant that certain criteria became 
redundant, while others were reinterpreted.
For ius in bello, the developments were different. It too came under the 
aegis of legal positivism. It became a separate chapter of the laws of war, 
coming on a par with ius ad bellum. The criterion of right intent evaporated. 
The fading of JWT made it possible for the laws of neutrality to emerge.
In Saving Private Ryan the discussion about “the decent thing” appears 
in instances when the rescue of a human life is at stake—the little girl and 
Private Ryan himself. I assume that Private Caparzo is not familiar with 
the terminology of JWT; but when he refers to “the decent thing to do” 
he seems to refer unwittingly to right intent. His fate demonstrates that 
the “morality of decency” and the “morality of war” clash.
Neither the laws of war, nor JWT, nor the concept of right intent can 
sufficiently inform Captain Miller. However, while empathy, humanitarian-
ism and respect for dignity are necessary and arguably new preconditions of 
the right intent, they are, on their own, insufficient and counterproductive. 
They will have to be embedded in considerations of military proficiency—if 
naiveté is to be avoided.
Finally—and at a higher level of abstraction—right intent seems to refer 
to considerations of an anthropological and perhaps transcendental nature: 
it curtails the calculus of a commanding officer which prioritizes the mis-
sion over the man, while it refers to a sense of purpose and indebtedness, 
which transcends the distinction between the military and the civilian 
life of a soldier. As the epilogue shows, there is no “case” of either Private 
Caparzo, or of Captain Miller or, for that matter, of Private Ryan. Cases 
can be closed and shelved. The epilogue reveals a narrative: the biographies 
of three men who tried to do their humanly fallible best amidst a hellish 
war have become inextricably intertwined.
Flexible to the extreme, the concept of right intent is beginning to receive 
a new conceptual content. In that renewed sense, it remains as valid as ever.
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